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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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

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
5. Congo: Reinforcement of Tshombé's forces continues.
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


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

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DAILY BRIEF



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

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Republic of the Congo



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[REDACTED]

Congo: (With UN efforts to bring about negotiations between Tshombé and Adoula largely stalemated, the Katanga cease-fire continues highlighted by the arrival of reinforcements to Tshombé's forces. Tshombé, who is believed to have received Dornier transport aircraft and possibly Fouga jets in late September, now is reported to have received [REDACTED] Canberra jet light bombers ordered from South Africa. According to press reports, white volunteers are continuing to cross the Rhodesian border into Katanga to serve with Tshombé's forces.)

[REDACTED] 25X1
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[REDACTED] 25X1

In contrast to Tshombé's strong position in southern Katanga, UN forces apparently control most strategic points in northern Katanga. A UN appraisal of the situation in northern Katanga, [REDACTED] characterized the strength and morale of UN forces there as good relative to that of Tshombé's forces.

[REDACTED] 25X1
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There are indications that the UN representative in Katanga, Conor O'Brien, may shortly be replaced. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Ecuador: A Communist-leftist general strike attempt which began on 4 October in Ecuador is the most serious threat to President Velasco since he took office in September 1960. The movement, designed to force Velasco's resignation, has touched off violence in at least three provincial cities and could spread to others. Quito and Guayaquil, centers of the country's political and economic life, have thus far remained relatively unaffected.

Ecuador's security forces, which have received special US equipment and training in riot control, are seeking additional equipment on an urgent priority to control the tense situation. They are believed loyal to Velasco but have apparently impressed upon him the need to adopt strong anti-Communist measures and to change his pro-Cuban, leftist foreign policies, possibly in exchange for their continuing support. A high-ranking military officer told the US army attaché in Quito on 6 October that Velasco is convinced he must break relations with Cuba and even outlaw the Ecuadorean Communist party.

Velasco's survival may hinge not only on the backing of the armed forces but also on the attitude of opposition conservative and moderate groups, many of which have been alienated by his leftist foreign policies and irresponsible economic measures.

(Backup, Page 3) (Map)

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
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Political Unrest in Ecuador

The strike was called by the Communist-dominated Ecuadorean Confederation of Workers (CTE), the country's principal labor organization, ostensibly to protest proposed new taxes, cost-of-living increases, and the July devaluation of the sucre, the nation's monetary unit. Although some of the CTE's major affiliates have refused to participate, the confederation has nevertheless demonstrated its ability to provoke violence and now can be counted among Velasco's leftist-Communist enemies.

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The principal strike violence erupted in three cities in the northern part of the country--Ibarra, Tulcan, and Esmeraldas, all of which were put under martial law. At least three persons have reportedly been killed and many others injured in clashes between security forces and demonstrators in these towns. (Military units had to be flown into Tulcan and Ibarra to reinforce the local garrisons.) The Communists now are attempting to spread the strike to Riobamba, a more important city south of Quito and on the rail link with Guayaquil. The strike, even though only partly successful, is likely to have adverse effects on the country's deteriorating economy.

Velasco's pressing need for US financial and military aid might lead him to reverse his pro-Cuban policy. This policy, along with those of some other Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and Brazil, has contributed substantially to the division within the members of the Organization of American States on the proper approach to the Cuban problem.

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